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Abstract
Envy-free up to one good (EF1) and envy-free up to any good (EFX) are two well-known extensions of
envy-freeness for the case of indivisible items. It is shown that EF1 can always be guaranteed for agents
with subadditive valuations [26]. In sharp contrast, it is unknown whether or not an EFX allocation always
exists, even for four agents and additive valuations. In addition, the best approximation guarantee for
EFX is (φ− 1) ' 0.61 by Amanitidis et al. [2].
In order to find a middle ground to bridge this gap, in this paper we suggest another fairness criterion,
namely envy-freeness up to a random good or EFR, which is weaker than EFX, yet stronger than EF1. For
this notion, we provide a polynomial-time 0.73-approximation allocation algorithm. For our algorithm
we introduce Nash Social Welfare Matching which makes a connection between Nash Social Welfare and
envy freeness. We believe Nash Social Welfare Matching will find its applications in future work.
1 Introduction
Fair division is a fundamental and interdisciplinary problem that has been extensively studied in economics,
mathematics, political science, and computer science [21, 30, 24, 20, 4, 25, 28, 26, 27, 5, 18, 2, 14]. Generally,
the goal is to find an allocation of a resource to n agents, which is agreeable to all the agents according to
their preferences. The first formal treatment of this problem was in 1948 by Steinhaus [31]. Following his
work, a vast literature has been developed and several notions for measuring fairness have been suggested
[31, 22, 12, 26, 14]. One of the most prominent and well-established fairness notions, introduced by Foley
[22], is envy-freeness, which requires that each agent prefers his share over that of any other agent.
Traditionally, envy-freeness has been studied for both divisible and indivisible resources. When the
resource is a single heterogeneous divisible item (i.e, can be fractionally allocated), envy-freeness admits
strong theoretical guarantees. For example, it is shown that allocations exist that allocate the entire resource,
and are both envy-free and Pareto efficient1 and allocate each agent a contiguous piece of the resource [32].
Apart from mere existence, there are algorithms that find an envy-free allocation for arbitrary number of
agents [3, 10, 19]. However, beyond divisibility, when dealing with a set of indivisible goods, envy-freeness is
too strong to be attained; for example, for two agents and a single indivisible good, the agent that receives
no good envies another party. Therefore, several relaxations of envy-freeness are introduced for the case
of indivisible items [26, 12, 14]. One of these relaxations, suggested by Budish [12], is envy-freeness up to
one good (EF1)2. An allocation of indivisible goods is EF1 if any possible envy of an agent for the share of
1 An allocation is Pareto efficient if it is not possible to reallocate the resources such that at least one agent is better off
without making any other person worse off.
2 It is worth to mention that before the work of Budish [12] EF1 was implicitly addressed by Lipton et. al [26].
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another agent can be resolved by removing some good from the envied share. In contrast to envy-freeness,
EF1 allocation always exists. Indeed, a simple round-robin algorithm always guarantees EF1 for additive
valuations, and a standard envy-graph based allocation guarantees EF1 for more general (sub-additive)
valuations. Besides, it is shown that any Nash welfare maximizing allocation (allocation that maximizes the
product of the agents’ utilities) is both Pareto efficient and EF1.
Recently, Caragiannis et al. [14] suggested another intriguing relaxation of envy-freeness, namely envy-
free up to any good (EFX), which attracted a lot of attention. An allocation is said to be EFX, if no agent
envies another agent after the removal of any item from the other agent’s bundle. Theoretically, this notion
is strictly stronger than EF1 and is strictly weaker than EF. In contrast to EF1, questions related to EFX
notion is relatively unexplored. As an example, despite significant effort [14], the existence of such allocations
is still unknown. The most impressive breakthrough in this area is the recent work of Chaudhury, Garg,
and Mehlhorn [16], which shows that for the case of 3 agents with additive valuations EFX allocation always
exists. Furthermore, unlike EF1, Nash social welfare maximizing allocations are not necessarily EFX [14].
Given this impenetrability of EFX, a growing strand of research started considering its relaxations. For
example, Plaut and Roughgarden [28], consider an approximate version of EFX3 and provide a 1/2 approx-
imation solution for agents with sub-additive valuation functions. For additive valuations, this factor is
recently improved to 0.618 by Amanatidis et al. [2]. Another interesting relaxation is EFX-with-charity.
Such allocations donate a bundle of items to charity and guarantee EFX for the rest of the items. The less
valuable the donated items are, the more desirable the allocation is. Caragiannis et al.[13] show that there
always exists an EFX-with-charity allocation where every agent receives half the value of his bundle in the
optimal Nash social welfare allocation. Recently, Chaudhury et al. [18] have proposed an EFX-with-charity
allocation such that no agent values the donated items more than his bundle and the number of donated
items is less than the number of agents.
Considering the huge discrepancy between EFX and EF1, in this paper we wish to find a middle ground
to bridge this gap. We therefore suggest another fairness criterion, namely envy-freeness up to a random
item or EFR, which is weaker than EFX, yet stronger than EF1. For this notion, we provide a polynomial
time 0.73-approximation algorithm, i.e., an algorithm that constructs 0.73-EFR allocations in polynomial
time. Our allocation method is based on a special type of matching, namely Nash Social Welfare Matching.
In Section 1.1, we briefly discuss our techniques to obtain these results.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
Envy-freeness up to a random item. We suggest a new fairness notion, namely evny-free up to a random
good (EFR). Roughly speaking, in an EFR allocation, no agent i envies another agent j (in expectation), if
we remove a random good from the bundle of agent j. In other words, the expected value of agent i for the
bundle allocated to agent j, after removing a random item from it is at most as much as the value of his
own bundle. Obviously, EFR is a weaker notion than EFX, yet stronger than EF1.
The intuition behind EFR is to use randomness to reduce the severe impact of small items. To see what
we mean by this term, consider the following scenario: suppose that the value of agent i for his share is 1000.
In addition, assume that the bundle allocated to an agent j contains two items, each with value 600 to agent
i. Even though the allocation is currently EFX with respect to agent i, allocating even a very small item
(say, with value close to 0 to agent i) to agent j violates EFX condition for agent i. This is counter-intuitive
in the sense that the last item allocated to agent j was totally worthless to agent i. On the other hand,
allocating any item with value less than 300 to agent j preserves EFR condition for agent i. This property
makes EFR more flexible, especially when the number of items is not too much. On the other hand, as the
number of items allocated to an agent grows larger, we expect EFX and EFR to be more and more aligned.
Similar to EFX, we provide a counter example which shows that a Nash Social Welfare allocation is not
necessarily EFR (see Example 4). This separates EFR from EF1 given the fact that a Nash Social welfare
allocation is always EF1[14]. It is worth mentioning that Caragiannis et al. [14] presented an example to
3 An allocation is α-approximate EFX, if for every pair of agents i and j, agent i believes that the share allocated to him is
worth at least α fraction of the share allocated to agent j, after removal of agent j’s least valued item (according to agent i’s
preference).
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show that Nash Social welfare allocation is not necessarily EFX. However, their example is still EFR. The
difference between these two examples can be seen as an evidence for the distinction between EFR and EFX.
As noted, the best approximation guarantee for EFX is 0.61 by Amanatidis et al. [2]. Since every EFX
allocation is also EFR, this result also provides a 0.61-approximation algorithm for EFR. In this paper, we
improve this ratio to 0.73.
Theorem 1. There exists an algorithm that finds a 0.73-EFR allocation. In addition, such an allocation
can be found in polynomial time.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we propose a three-step algorithm that finds a 0.73-EFR allocation in
polynomial time. Roughly speaking, in the first two steps, we allocate valuable (i.e., large) items while
preserving the 0.73-EFR property. Next, we use an envy-cycle based procedure to allocate the rest of the
items. Figure 1 shows a flowchart of our method.
Initial
Allocation
Refinement
Allocation
Envy-graph
based
Step 1: Step 2: Step 3:
Figure 1: Flowchart of the 0.73-EFR allocation algorithm
The first challenge to address is the method by which we must allocate large items in the first step.
Interestingly, we introduce a special type of matching allocation with intriguing properties which makes it
ideal for our algorithm. We call such an allocation a Nash Social Welfare Matching.
Nash Social Welfare Matching. In the first step of the algorithm, we allocate one item to each agent
such that the product of the utilities of the agents is maximized. The interesting fact about this allocation
is that, not only does this allocation allocates large items, but it also provides very useful information about
the value of the rest of the items. In Section 2 we broadly discuss such allocations and their properties.
However, to shed light on their usefulness, assume that after a Nash Social Welfare Matching, agent i envies
agent j with a ratio α > 1, meaning that he thinks the value of the good allocated to agent j is α times more
than the value of his item. In that case, we can immediately conclude that the item allocated to agent j is
α times more valuable to him (agent j) than any remaining item; otherwise, we could improve the utility
product by allocating the most valuable remaining item to agent j and giving his former item to agent i
(and of course, freeing agent i’s former item). In addition, we can express the same proposition for the value
of the item allocated to agent i for agent j: the value of this item for agent j is at most 1/α of the item
allocated to agent j. The above statement can be generalized to the arguments that include more than two
agents. With this aim, we introduce several new concepts, including envy-ratio graph (a complete weighted
graph that represents the envy-ratios between agents), improving cycles, and envy-rank.
It is worth mentioning that the main challenge in many fair allocation problems for different fairness
criteria (e.g., MMS, EFX) is allocating valuable items. The structure of such matchings makes them ideal
for allocating these items. We strongly believe that using Nash Social Welfare matching is not only useful
for our algorithm, but can also be seen as a strong tool in the way of finding fair allocations related to the
other fairness notions, especially maximin-share. In Section 4 we show how to use NSW mathcing to obtain
a simple algorithm with the approximation ratio of (φ− 1) ' 0.61 for EFX. The approximation ratio of our
algorithm matches the state-of-the-art (φ− 1) approximation result by Amanitidis et al. [1].
1.2 Related work
Fair allocation of a divisible resource (known as cake cutting) was first introduced by Steinhaus[31] in 1948,
and since then has been the subject of intensive studies. We refer the reader to [11] and [29] for an overview
of different fairness notions and their related results. Proportionality and Envy-freeness are among the most
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well-established notions for cake cutting. As mentioned, the literature of cake cutting admits strong positive
results for these two notions (see [31] for details).
Since neither EF nor proportionality or any approximation of these notions can be guaranteed for indi-
visible goods, several relaxations are introduced for these two notions in the past decade. These relaxations
include EF1 and EFX for envy-freeness and maximin-share [12] for proportionality. Nash Social Welfare
(NSW) is also another important notion in allocation of indivisible goods which is somewhat a trade off
between fairness and optimality.
Apart from the results mentioned in the introduction for EFX and EF1, there are other studies related
to these notions[8, 7, 9, 13, 14, 15]. In particular, Barman et al. [8] propose a pseudo-polynomial time
algorithm that finds an EF1 and pareto efficient allocation. They also show that any EF1 and pareto efficient
allocation approximates Nash Social Welfare with a factor of 1.45. In contrast to EF1, our knowledge of EFX
and NSW beyond additive valuations is limited. For EFX, the only positive results for general valuations is
the work of Plaut and Roughgarden [28] which provides a 1/2-EFX allocation. For NSW, Grag et al. [23]
prove an O(n log n) approximation guarantee for submodular valuations. Recently this factor is improved to
O(n)[17].
Maximin-share is one of the most well-studied notions in the recent years. In a pioneering study, Kurokawa
et al. [25] provide an approximation algorithm with the factor of 2/3 for maximin-share, which is improved
to 3/4 by Ghodsi et al [24]. Beyond additivity, Barman et al. [5] show that a simple round robin algorihtm
can guarantee 1/10-MMS for submodular valuations, and Ghodsi et al. provide approximation guarantees for
submodular (1/3), XOS (1/5) and subadditive (1/ log n) valuations. In addition, several notions are ramified
from maximin-share, including weighted maximin-share (WMMS) [21], pairwise maximin-share (PMMS)[14],
and groupwise maximin-share (GMMS)[6]. Several studies consider the relation between these notions and
seek to find an allocation that guarantees a subset of them simultaneously. For example, Amanatidis et al.
[1] investigate the connections between EF1, EFX, maximin share, and pairwise maximin share. They show
that any EF1 allocation is also a 1/n-MMS and a 1/2-PMMS allocation. They also prove that any EFX
allocation is a 4/7-MMS and a 2/3-PMMS allocation.
2 Preliminaries and Basic Observations
Fair allocation problem. An instance of fair allocation problem consists of a set of n agents, a setM of
m goods, and a valuation profile V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}. Each vi is a function of the form 2M → R≥0 which
specifies the preferences of agent i ∈ [n] over the goods. Throughout the paper, we assume that a valuation
function vi satisfies the following conditions.
• Normalization: vi(∅) = 0.
• Monotonicity: vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) whenever S ⊆ T .
• Additivity: vi(S) =
∑
b∈S vi({b}).
An allocation of a set S of goods is an n-partition A = 〈A1,A2, . . . ,An〉 of S, where Ai is the bundle
allocated to agent i. Allocation is complete, if S = M and is partial otherwise. Since we are interested in
the allocations that allocate the whole set of items, the final allocation must be complete.
Fairness critera. Given an instance of fair division problem and an allocation A, an agent i envies another
agent j, if he strictly prefers Aj over his bundle Ai. An allocation is then said to be envy-free (EF), if no
agent envies another, i.e., for every pair i, j ∈ [n] of agents we have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj). As mentioned, envy-
freeness is too strong to be guaranteed in an allocation of indivisible items. Therefore, two relaxations of
this notion are introduced, namely envy-free up to one good (EF1) and envy-free up to any good (EFX).
Definition 2. An allocation A is called
• envy-free up to one good (EF1) if for all i, j we have vi(Ai) ≥ minb∈Aj vi(Aj \ {b}),
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• envy-free up to any good (EFX) if for all i, j we have vi(Ai) ≥ maxb∈Aj vi(Aj \ {b}).
Even though these two notions seem to be somewhat related, there is a huge discrepancy between the
current results obtained for them. It is shown that even for instances with general valuations, an EF1
allocation always exists, and can be computed in polynomial time [26]. In contrast, whether or not an EFX
allocation always exists is still open, even for additive valuations.
In this paper, we introduce another relaxation of envy-freeness, namely envy-free up to a random good.
Let Dj be a uniform distribution over the items of Aj that selects each item with probability 1/|Aj |.
Definition 3. Allocation A is envy-free up to a random good (EFR) if for all i, j we have
vi(Ai) ≥ E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
]
.
Clearly, EFR lies in between EFX and EF1: EFX is a stronger notion of fairness than EFR, and EFR is
stronger than EF1. In Example 4, we show one structural difference between EF1 and EFR: in contrast to
EF1, EFR is not implied by an allocation that maximizes Nash social welfare.
1 2 3 4 5
v1 3 3 1 1 1
v2 5 5 1 4 3
Figure 2: Agents’ valuations over items
Example 4. Consider an instance of the fair allocation problem with 5 items, and 2 agents with the
valuations represented in Figure 2. The unique allocation that maximizes the NSW allocates the first 3
items to the first agent, and the other 2 items to the second agent. Let A be this allocation. Since there are
3 items in the first agent’s bundle, we have
E
b∼D1
[
v2(A1 \ {b})
]
=
1
3
· (v2(A1 \ {1}) + v2(A1 \ {2}) + v2(A1 \ {3}))
=
22
3
≥ v2(A2) = 7 .
Hence, this allocation is not EFR.
Finally, approximate versions of EFX and EFR are defined as follows.
Definition 5. For a constant c ≤ 1, an allocation A is called
• c-approximate envy-free up to any good (c-EFX), if for all i, j we have
vi(Ai) ≥ c ·max
b∈Aj
vi(Aj \ {b}) ,
• c-approximate envy-free up to a random good (c-EFR) if for all i, j we have
vi(Ai) ≥ c · E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
]
.
Note that Example 4 also shows that the maximum NSW allocation does not guarantee better than 2122
approximation of EFR.
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Envy-ratio Graph. Envy-ratio graph is in fact a generalization of envy-graph introduced by Lipton et al.
[26]. Suppose that at some stage of our algorithm we have a partial allocation A. We define a graph called
envy-ratio graph to be a complete weighted digraph with the following construction: each vertex corresponds
to an agent, and for each ordered pair (i, j), there is a directed edge from vertex i to vertex j with the weight
wi,j = vi(Aj)/vi(Ai).
Assuming each agent has a non-zero value for each good, for every i, j we have wi,j ∈ [0,∞). Note that
wi,j ≤ 1 implies that agent i does not envy agent j, whereas wi,j > 1 indicates agent i envies agent j. The
higher the value of wi,j is, the more envious agent i is to the bundle of agent j. Indeed, the well-known
envy-graph is a subgraph of envy-ratio graph containing only the edges with wi,j > 1.
Nash Social Welfare (NSW) Mathcing. Nash social welfare, originally proposed by Nash [27], is
defined to be the geometric mean of agents’ valuations. Allocation that maximizes Nash social welfare is
known to have desirable properties. For example, such allocations are proved to be EF1 and pareto optimal.
Roughly, Nash social welfare maximizing allocations can be seen as a trade-off between social welfare and
fairness.
In the first step of the algorithm, we allocate one item to each agent such that the Nash social welfare of
the agents is maximized. More formally, define Nash Social Welfare matching of [m] to be a partial allocation
A = 〈A1,A2, . . . ,An〉, such that Πivi(Ai) is maximized and for every i we have |Ai| = 1.
Similar to Nash social welfare allocations, Nash social welfare matchings exhibit beautiful properties which
greatly help us in designing our algorithm. One simple property of such allocations is shown in Observation
7. Before we state Observation 7, we need to define concepts of improving and strictly improving cycles.
Definition 6. Let c = i1 → i2 → . . .→ ik → i1 be a cycle in the envy-ratio graph. Then, c is an improving
cycle, if
wi1,i2 × wi2,i3 × . . .× wik−1,ik × wik,i1 > 1 .
Furthermore, we say a cycle c is strictly improving cycle, if c is an improving cycle and for every (i→ j) ∈ c,
wi,j > 1 holds.
We note that strictly improving cycle is an essential concept in all envy-cycle elimination methods [26,
5, 18, 2]. These methods typically rotate the shares over strictly improving cycles to enhance social welfare.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous work made use of improving cycles.
Observation 7. Suppose that we allocate one item to each agent using Nash social welfare matching. Then,
the envy-ratio graph admits no improving cycle.
The proof of the mentioned observation is available in Appendix A. A particularly useful case of Obser-
vation 7 is for the cycles of length 2, which we state in Corollary 8.
Corollary 8 (of Observation 7). Suppose that for two agents i, j we have vi(Aj) ≥ r · vi(Ai), where r ≥ 1.
Then, we have vj(Ai) ≤ vj(Aj)/r.
Definition 9. Suppose that we allocate one item to each agent using Nash social welfare matching. We
define the envy-rank of an agent i, denoted by ri as
ri = max
j0,j1,...,jk
k∏
z=1
wjz,jz−1 ,
where j0 = i. Roughly speaking, let p be a path leading to vertex i in the envy-ratio graph such that the
product of the weights of the edges in p is maximum. Then, the envy-rank of agent i equals to the product
of the weights of the edges in p. Note that by Observation 7 we can assume w.l.o.g that p is a simple path
(i.e., p includes no duplicate vertices).
Observation 10. p is a simple path.
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1 2 3 4
v1 8 2 4 3
v2 4 2 0 2
v3 0 3 2 2
v4 1 6 3 9
(a) Agents’ valuations over items
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(d) Envy-ratio graph after eliminating a cycle.
Figure 3: An example to illustrate envy-ratio graph.
Proof. Assume p is not simple and let c be a cycle in p. By Observation 7 we know that c can not be
improving. Therefore, the product of the weight of the edges of p \ c is at least as large as p.
To get a better understanding of these definitions take a look at Example 11.
Example 11. Consider an instance of the fair allocation problem with 4 items, 4 agents, and a valuation
profile V = {v1, v2, v3, v4} represented in Figure 3a. Let A be the allocation that allocates item i to agent
i. The envy-ratio graph and the envy graph of A are shown in Figure 3b and Figure 3c respectively. This
allocation is not envy-free, however, it is both EFX and EFR since each agent receives only one item.
As we mentioned before, the envy-rank of an agent can be seen as the product of the weights of the edges
in a path leading to that agent. For instance, consider the agent 1. The envy-rank of this agent is 3 which
is the product of the weights of the edges in the path 3 → 2 → 1. Also consider the cycle 1 → 3 → 2 → 1.
This cycle is an improving cycle. Therefore, allocation A is not a NSW matching. The allocation can be
improved by moving the items alongside this cycle which leads to a new allocation A′ = 〈{3}, {1}, {2}, {4}〉.
The envy-ratio graph of A′ can be seen in Figure 3d.
We finish our discussion in this section by mentioning some properties of envy-rank values. The proofs
of flowing observations are available in Appendix A.
Observation 12. Suppose that allocation A allocates one item to each agent using a Nash social welfare
matching. Then for every pair of agents i and j, we have
vi(Aj)
vi(Ai) ≤ min
{
rj ,
rj
ri
}
.
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In addition to Observation 7, Nash social welfare matchings admit another important and elegant prop-
erty, which we state in Observation 13. This observation provides upper bounds on the value of remaining
goods and can be of independent interest for various fair allocation problems.
Observation 13. Suppose that we allocate one item to each agent using a Nash social welfare matching.
Then, for each agent i and any unallocated item b we have
vi(b) ≤ min
{
vi(Ai), vi(Ai)
ri
}
.
3 An approximate EFR Allocation
In this section, we present our algorithm for finding a 0.73-EFR allocation. Our algorithm is divided into 3
steps, namely NSW matching, allocation refinement, and envy-graph based allocation. In the first step, we
allocate each agent one item using a Nash social welfare matching and accordingly divide the agents into
three groups based on their envy-rank. Next, in the second step we allocate a set of goods to the agents
in each group, and finally in the third step we allocate the rest of the items using the classic envy-cycle
elimination method. The outline of our algorithm is represented in Algorithm 1.
ALGORITHM 1: The outline of the 0.73-EFR algorithm.
Parameters : ϕ =
√
3 + 1.
// Step 1
Allocate NSW matching;
Let ri be envy-rank of an agent i. Divide the agents into groups G1, G2, G3 as follows. Agent i belongs to G1 if
ri > ϕ, belongs to G2 if 2 < ri ≤ ϕ, and belongs to G3 if ri ≤ 2;
// Step 2
Let O be a topological ordering of the agents with respect to the envy-graph;
foreach i ∈ G3 ordered by O do
Ask agent i to pick his most valuable remaining item;
end
foreach i ∈ G3 ordered by O do
Ask agent i to pick his most valuable remaining item;
end
foreach i ∈ G2 ordered by O do
Ask agent i to pick his most valuable remaining item;
end
// Step 3
while the allocation is not complete do
Eliminate all directed cycles in the envy-graph;
Let s be an arbitrary source in the envy-graph;
Ask agent s to pick his most valuable remaining item;
end
return the allocation;
3.1 Step 1.
In the first step, we allocate one item to each agent using a NSW matching. We first show that this allocation
can be found in polynomial time. The proof is available in Appendix A.
Observation 14. NSW matching can be found in polynomial time.
Let A be NSW matching and fix a parameter ϕ = √3 + 1. Based on the envy-rank of the agents, we
divide them into 3 groups G1,G2, and G3 as follows.
• Agent i belongs to G1 if ri > ϕ.
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• Agent i belongs to G2 if 2 < ri ≤ ϕ.
• Agent i belongs to G3 if ri ≤ 2.
Note that by Observation 13, we know that for every remaining item b the following properties hold.
• (Property 1): For every agent i ∈ G1 we have vi(b) < vi(Ai)/ϕ.
• (Property 2): For every agent i ∈ G2 we have vi(b) < vi(Ai)/2.
Intuitively, if each remaining item is worth less than vi(Ai)/ϕ to every agent i, then we can guarantee
the approximation factor of 1/(1 + 1/ϕ) in the third step. This property holds for the agents in G1; however,
this is not the case for agents in G2 and G3. In the second step, we seek to allocate a set of items to the
agents in G2 and G3 so that the same property holds for these agents. Note that alongside this property, the
final partial allocation after the second step must be fair (i.e., 0.73-EFR).
3.2 Step 2.
In the second step, we allocate one item to each agent in G2 and two items to each agent in G3. Algorithm
1 shows the method by which we allocate these items to the agents in G2 and G3. Let O be a topological
ordering of the agents with respect to the envy-graph. We order the agents in G3 according to O and ask
them one by one to pick their most valuable remaining good. We then again ask agents in G3 to pick one
more item according to the same topological ordering O. Afterwards, we order the agents in G2 according
to O and ask them one by one to add the most desirable remaining item to their bundles.
We now show that at the end of Step 2 the following conditions hold. The proof can be found in Appendix
B.
Claim 15. At the end of Step 2 the following conditions hold.
• The allocation is EFR with respect to the agents in G1.
• The allocation is (3/4)-EFR with respect to the agents in G2.
• The allocation is (2/ϕ)-EFR with respect to the agents in G3.
Since 2/ϕ < 3/4, the allocation by the end of Step 2 is (2/ϕ)-EFR.
3.3 Step 3.
In the third step, we use the envy-graph to allocate the remaining unallocated items. We repeat the following
steps until all the goods are allocated.
• Find and eliminate all the directed cycles from the envy-graph. In order to eliminate all cycles in the
envy-graph, we repeatedly find a directed cycle in the envy-graph. Let i1 → i2 → · · · → ik → i1 be a
cycle in envy-graph. By definition, each agent ij envies agent i(j mod k)+1, i.e.,
vij (Aij ) < vij
(Ai(j mod k)+1) ,
where A is the current allocation. We then exchange the allocations of the agents that are in the
cycle such that each agent ij receives Ai(j mod k)+1 . Note that this exchanging does not change bundles.
Furthermore, the utility of each agent does not decrease. Hence, if the allocation is α-EFR before
the exchange, it remains α-EFR after it (Lemma 6.1 in [28]). Also, exchanging these allocations
decreases the number of edges in the envy-graph. Thus, we eventually find an allocation such that its
corresponding envy-graph is acyclic.
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• Give an item to an agent that no-one envies. In the previous step we showed that we can always find
an allocation such that its corresponding envy-graph is acyclic. Therefore, there should be a vertex in
the envy-graph with no incoming edges. Let i be the agent corresponding to this vertex. Since i has
no incoming edges in the envy-graph, no other agent envies i. At this step, we ask agent i to pick his
best item among all remaining goods.
The following Lemma shows the approximation guarantee of our algorithm. The proof can be found in
Appendix A.
Lemma 16. Suppose that we are given a partial α-EFR allocation A such that for every agent i and every
remaining item b, we have vi(b) ≤ α′ · vi(Ai) for some constant α′ ≤ 1. Then, the resulting allocation after
performing the method mentioned above is min{α, 11+α′ }-EFR.
We now show that at the beginning of Step 3, the valuation of every remaining item is small for all
agents. The proof is available in Appendix A.
Observation 17. Let A be the allocation after Step 2. Then for an agent i and every remaining item b we
have
• If i ∈ G1, vi(b) ≤ vi(Ai)/ϕ.
• If i ∈ G2, vi(b) ≤ vi(Ai)/3.
• If i ∈ G3, vi(b) ≤ vi(Ai)/3.
It follows from the observation above that for every agent i the valuation of every remaining item is at
most vi(Ai)/ϕ after the second step of our algorithm. Recall that our allocation by the end of Step 2 is
(2/ϕ)-EFR. Therefore, using Lemma 16, the allocation at the end of Step 3 is min
{
2
ϕ ,
1
1+1/ϕ
}
-EFR. Since
ϕ =
√
3 + 1, we have
2
ϕ
=
1
1 + 1/ϕ
=
√
3− 1.
Therefore our final allocation is
√
3 − 1 ≈ 0.73-EFR. This, coupled with the fact that all the steps can be
implemented in polynomial time follows Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. There exists an algorithm that finds a 0.73-EFR allocation. In addition, such an allocation
can be found in polynomial time.
4 Simple (φ− 1)-EFX Allocation
In this section, we show that our idea to use NSW matching as the first step of the allocation can easily
give a (φ− 1)-EFX allocation where φ = 1+
√
5
2 is the golden ratio. The approximation ratio of our algorithm
matches the state-of-the-art (φ−1) approximation result by Amanitidis et al. [1]. Likewise our algorithm for
EFR allocation, our (φ− 1)-EFX algorithm consists of 3 steps, namely NSW matching, allocation refinement,
and envy-graph based allocation. The first and the third steps of our algorithm are almost the same as our
previous algorithm. For the sake of completeness, we will briefly restate these steps in the rest of the section.
The outline of our algorithm is represented in Algorithm 2.
4.1 Step 1.
In the first step, we allocate one item to each agent using NSW matching. Let A be the resulting allocation,
and let φ = 1+
√
5
2 be the golden ratio. Based on the envy-rank of the agents, we divide them into 2 groups
G1 and G2, as follows:
• Agent i belongs to G1 if ri > φ.
• Agent i belongs to G2 if ri ≤ φ.
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ALGORITHM 2: The outline of the (φ− 1)-EFX algorithm.
// Step 1
Allocate NSW matching;
Let ri be envy-rank of an agent i. Divide the agents into groups G1 and G2 as follows. Agent i belongs to G1 if
ri > φ and belongs to G2 otherwise;
// Step 2
Let O be a topological ordering of the agents with respect to the envy-graph;
foreach i ∈ G2 ordered by O do
Ask agent i to pick his most valuable remaining item;
end
// Step 3
while the allocation is not complete do
Eliminate all directed cycles in the envy-graph;
Let s be an arbitrary source in the envy-graph;
Ask agent s to pick his most valuable remaining item;
end
return the allocation;
4.2 Step 2.
In the second step, we allocate one item to each agent in G2 via the following process. let O be a topological
ordering of the agents with respect to the envy-graph. We order the agents in G2 according to O and ask
them one by one to pick their most valuable remaining good.
After this step, the bundle of every agent in G2 contains two items. For an agent i ∈ G2 we use {bi, b′i} to
denote the items allocated to this agent where b′i is the item allocated in Step 2. We also use {bi} to denote
the only item received by an agent i ∈ G1. We show that at the end of Step 2 the following clamis hold.
Claim 18. By the end of Step 2, the allocation is EFX with respect to the agents in G1.
Proof. Let i be an agent in G1, we show that for every other agent j we have
vi(Ai) ≥ max
b∈Aj
vi(Aj \ {b}) ,
so the allocation is EFX from the agent i’s perspective. If j ∈ G1, then we have |Aj | = 1. Therefore,
max
b∈Aj
vi(Aj \ {b}) = 0 ,
and the claim clearly holds.
Consider an agent j ∈ G2. At the end of Step 2, agent j has two allocated items. By Observation 13, the
valuation of the item b′j for agent i is bounded by vi(Ai)/ri = vi(bi)/ri. Therefore,
max
b∈Aj
vi(Aj \ {b}) = max
{
vi(bj), vi(b
′
j)
}
≤ max{vi(bj), vi(bi)/ri} Observation 13.
≤ max{vi(bi), vi(bi)/ri} Observation 12.
= vi(bi) = vi(Ai) . ri > 1.
Therefore the allocation is EFX.
Claim 19. By the end of Step 2, the allocation is (φ− 1)-EFX with respect to the agents in G2.
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Proof. Let i be an agent in G2, we show that for every other agent j we have
vi(Ai) ≥ (φ− 1) ·max
b∈Aj
vi(Aj \ {b}) ,
so the allocation is (φ− 1)-EFX from agent i’s perspective. If j ∈ G1, then we have |Aj | = 1, and the claim
clearly holds.
Consider an agent j in G2. We first consider the case that vi(bi) < vi(bj). In this case, the position of
agent i in O is before agent j. Therefore, agent i receives his second good before agent j, and we have
vi(b
′
i) ≥ vi(b′j) . (1)
It follows that
max
b∈Aj
vi(Aj \ {b}) = max
{
vi(bj), vi(b
′
j)
}
≤ max{vi(bj), vi(b′i)} By (1).
≤ max{rj · vi(bi), vi(b′i)} Observation 12.
≤ max{φ · vi(bi), vi(b′i)} rj ≤ φ.
≤ φ · (vi(bi) + vi(b′i))
= φ · vi(Ai) .
Therefore,
vi(Ai) ≥ 1
φ
·max
b∈Aj
vi(Aj \ {b}) .
Since 1φ = φ− 1, it follows that our allocation is (φ− 1)-EFX. The other case is when vi(bi) ≥ vi(bj). In this
case, we have
max
b∈Aj
vi(Aj \ {b}) = max
{
vi(bj), vi(b
′
j)
}
≤ max{vi(bi), vi(b′j)} vi(bi) ≥ vi(bj).
≤ max{vi(bi), vi(bi)} Observation 13.
= vi(bi) ≤ vi(Ai) .
Therefore, in this case the allocation is EFX which completes the proof of the claim.
4.3 Step 3.
In the third step, we use the envy-graph to allocate the rest of the items. We show that at the beginning of
Step 3, the valuation of every remaining item is small for all the agents.
Observation 20. Let A be the allocation after Step 2. Then, for an agent i and every remaining item b we
have
• If i ∈ G1, vi(b) ≤ vi(Ai)/φ.
• If i ∈ G2, vi(b) ≤ vi(Ai)/2.
Proof. Consider an agent i ∈ G1, then by Observation 13 we have
vi(b) ≤ vi(Ai)/ri ≤ vi(Ai)/φ .
Next, consider an agent i ∈ G2. This agent has two allocated items which are larger than every remaining
item. Therefore, vi(b) ≤ v(Ai)/2.
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Therefore, for every agent i, the valuation of every remaining item is at most vi(Ai)/φ. In order to
complete the allocation we repeat the following steps until all the goods are allocated.
• Find and eliminate all the directed cycles from the envy-graph.
• Allocate an item to an agent that no-one envies to him.
Lemma 21 ([28]). Suppose that we are given a partial α-EFX allocation A such that for every agent i and
every remaining item b, we have vi(b) ≤ α′ · (Ai) for some constant α′ ≤ 1. Then, the resulting allocation
after performing the method mentioned above is min{α, 11+α′ }-EFX.
Recall that our allocation by the end of Step 2 is (φ− 1)-EFX. Therefore, by lemma above the approxi-
mation ratio of our approach is min{φ− 1, 11+1/φ}. Since 11+1/φ = φ− 1, it follows that our final allocation
is (φ− 1) ≈ 0.61-EFX.
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A Missing proofs
A.1 Missing proofs of Section 2
Observation 7. Suppose that we allocate one item to each agent using Nash social welfare matching. Then,
the envy-ratio graph admits no improving cycle.
Proof. Assume c = i1 → i2 → . . .→ ik → i1 is an improving cycle. Then, it is easy to see that rotating the
goods over this cycle (i.e., reallocating Aij to agent ij−1 for every 1 < j ≤ k, and reallocating Ai1 to agent
ik) yields a matching with a higher Nash social welfare.
Observation 12. Suppose that allocation A allocates one item to each agent using a Nash social welfare
matching. Then for every pair of agents i and j, we have
vi(Aj)
vi(Ai) ≤ min
{
rj ,
rj
ri
}
.
Proof. In the envy-ratio graph, the weight of the directed edge from i to j is wi,j =
vi(Aj)
vi(Ai) . Recall that rj is
the maximum product of the weights of the edges in a path leading to j. Since the edge from i to j is also a
path leading to vertex j, we have wi,j ≤ rj . Therefore, vi(Aj)vi(Ai) ≤ rj . Now consider a path p leading to i with
the maximum product of the weights of the edges. Based on the definition of envy-rank, the product of the
weights of the edges in p is ri. We can use the edge from i to j to extend this path. This new path leads to
j, and its product of the weights of the edges is ri · wi,j . Therefore, we can say rj ≥ ri · wi,j . Hence,
vi(Aj)
vi(Ai) = wi,j ≤
rj
ri
.
Observation 13. Suppose that we allocate one item to each agent using a Nash social welfare matching.
Then, for each agent i and any unallocated item b we have
vi(b) ≤ min
{
vi(Ai), vi(Ai)
ri
}
.
Proof. First, for any agent i and any remaining good b, we have vi(b) ≤ vi(Ai), if not NSW can be increased
by giving b to i instead of Ai. Moreover, consider a path p = i1 → i2 → . . . ik → i in the envy-ratio graph
leading to i with the maximum product of the weights of the edges. By the definition of the envy-rank the
product of the weights of this path is ri. By moving items along this path (giving Ai to ik, Aik to ik−1, etc.)
and giving b to agent i, the NSW will be multiplied by a factor of ri · vi(b)vi(Ai) . Since A is the allocation that
maximizes NSW, we have ri · vi(b)vi(Ai) ≤ 1, and hence vi(b) ≤
vi(Ai)
ri
.
A.2 Missing proofs of Section 3
Observation 14. NSW matching can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. Let G = (U1, U2) be a bipartite graph that has a vertex for each agent in U1 and has a vertex
for every item in U2. For every agent i and every item b we add an undirected edge with the weight of
log vi({b}) between their corresponding vertices. By finding a maximum weighted matching in this graph,
we get an allocation A such that every agent has at most one allocated item. Also, this allocation maximizes∑n
i=1 log vi(Ai). Therefore, this allocation also maximizes
∏n
i=1 vi(Ai). Hence, A allocates at most one item
to every agent and maximizes Nash social welfare.
Lemma 16. Suppose that we are given a partial α-EFR allocation A such that for every agent i and every
remaining item b, we have vi(b) ≤ α′ · vi(Ai) for some constant α′ ≤ 1. Then, the resulting allocation after
performing the method mentioned above is min{α, 11+α′ }-EFR.
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Proof. The algorithm repeats the following steps until it allocates all items.
• Find and eliminate all the directed cycles from the envy-graph.
• Give an item to an agent that no-one envies.
Consider the step in which the algorithm eliminates cycles. As we discussed earlier, this step does not
change the approximation factor of the algorithm. Hence, if the allocation is α-EFR before this step, it
remains α-EFR after it (See Lemma 6.1 in [28] for more detail).
Consider the second step of the algorithm. In this step, the algorithm finds an agent such that no-one
envies this agent, and it allocates an item to this agent. Suppose our algorithm allocates item b to agent
i. Since no-one envies agent i before this step, for every other agent j, we have vj(Ai) ≤ vj(Aj) where A
is the allocation of items before this step. In addition we have vj(b) ≤ α′ · vj(Aj) since item b was among
unallocated items at the beginning of this step. Thus, we have
vj(Ai) + vj(b) ≤ (1 + α′) · vj(Aj) .
This means that after allocation b, no agent j thinks the value of the bundle of agent i is (1 + α′) times
more than the valuation his bundle. Therefore, the allocation remains 11+α′ -EFR. Hence, the final allocation
is min{α, 11+α′ }-EFR.
Observation 17. Let A be the allocation after Step 2. Then for an agent i and every remaining item b we
have
• If i ∈ G1, vi(b) ≤ vi(Ai)/ϕ.
• If i ∈ G2, vi(b) ≤ vi(Ai)/3.
• If i ∈ G3, vi(b) ≤ vi(Ai)/3.
Proof. Consider an agent i ∈ G1, then by Observation 13 we have
vi(b) ≤ vi(Ai)/ri ≤ vi(Ai)/ϕ .
Next consider an agent i ∈ G2. This agent has two allocated items. Let Ai = {bi, b′i} be these items where
bi is the item allocated using NSW matching. Since agent i picks his best remaining item at Step 2 of our
algorithm, we have
vi(b) ≤ vi(b′i) . (2)
Since bi is allocated by NSW matching, by Observation 13 we have
vi(b) ≤ vi(bi)/ri
≤ vi(bi)/2 . Since ri > 2. (3)
It follows from (2) and (3) that
vi(b) ≤
(
vi(bi) + vi(b
′
i)
)
/3 = vi(Ai)/3 .
The last case is when i ∈ G3. In this case agent i has three allocated items which are all larger than every
remaining item. Therefore vi(b) ≤ v(Ai)/3.
17
B Proof of Claim 15
After the Step 2 of the algorithm, the bundle of every agent in G3 contains three items. For an agent i ∈ G3
we use {bi, b′i, b′′i } to denote the items allocated to this agent where b′i and b′′i are the items allocated in Step
2 and b′i has been allocated before b
′′
i . Also, the bundle of every agent in G2 contains two items. Similarly,
for an agent i ∈ G2 we use {bi, b′i} to denote the allocated items of this agent where b′i is the item received
in Step 2. We also use {bi} to denote the only item received by an agent i ∈ G1.
We begin our analysis by showing the following claim.
Claim 22. For an allocation A and agents i and j, we have
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
]
=
|Aj | − 1
|Aj | · vi(Aj) .
Proof. Distribution Dj selects each item in Aj with the probability of 1/|Aj |. Therefore,
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
]
=
1
|Aj | ·
∑
b∈Aj
vi(Aj \ {b})
=
1
|Aj | ·
∑
b∈Aj
∑
b′∈Aj\{b}
vi({b′}) . By Additivity assumption.
Each item in Aj appears |Aj | − 1 times in the above summation. Therefore,
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
]
=
1
|Aj | ·
∑
b∈Aj
∑
b′∈Aj\{b}
vi({b′})
=
|Aj | − 1
|Aj | ·
∑
b∈Aj
vi({b}) = |Aj | − 1|Aj | · vi(Aj) .
First we show that at the end of Step 2, the allocation is EFR for the agents in G1.
Claim 23. By the end of Step 2, the allocation is EFR with respect to the agents in G1.
Proof. Let i be an agent in G1, we show that for every other agent j we have
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
] ≤ vi(Ai),
so the allocation is EFR from the agent i’s perspective.
• If j ∈ G1, then we have |Aj | = 1 and the claim clearly holds.
• If j ∈ G2, then at the end of Step 2, agent j has two allocated items. By Observation 13 the valuation
of the item b′j for agent i is bounded by vi(Ai)/ri = vi(bi)/ri. Therefore,
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
]
=
vi(bj) + vi(b
′
j)
2
Claim 22.
≤ vi(bj) + vi(bi)/ri
2
Observation 13.
≤ vi(bi) + vi(bi)/ri
2
Observation 12.
=
1 + 1/ri
2
· vi(bi) .
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Since agent i is in G1, we have ri ≥ ϕ. It follows that
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
] ≤ 1 + 1/ri
2
· vi(bi)
≤ 1 + 1/ϕ
2
· vi(bi)
=
ϕ+ 1
2ϕ
· vi(bi) .
Since ϕ =
√
3 + 1, we have ϕ+12ϕ < 1. Therefore,
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
] ≤ ϕ+ 1
2ϕ
· vi(bi) < vi(bi) = vi(Ai) .
Therefore, in this case the allocation is EFR.
• The only remaining case is when agent j is in G3. By Observation 13, valuation of b′j and b′′j for agent
i is at most vi(bi)/ri. Also, by Observation 12, valuation of bj for agent i is at most rj · vi(bi)/ri.
Therefore,
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
]
=
2
3
· (vi(bj) + vi(b′j) + vi(b′′j )) Claim 22.
≤ 2
3
· (vi(bj) + 2vi(bi)/ri) Observation 13.
≤ 2
3
· (rj · vi(bi)/ri + 2vi(bi)/ri) Observation 12.
=
2rj/ri + 4/ri
3
· vi(bi) .
Recall that agents i and j are in G1 and G3 respectively. Therefore, ri ≥ ϕ and rj ≤ 2. We then have
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
] ≤ 2rj/ri + 4/ri
3
· vi(bi)
≤ 8/ϕ
3
· vi(bi)
Since ϕ =
√
3 + 1, we have 8/ϕ3 < 1. Therefore,
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
] ≤ 8/ϕ
3
· vi(bi) < vi(bi) = vi(Ai) .
Therefore the allocation is EFR.
Now we show that at the end of Step 2, the allocation is (3/4)-EFR with respect to the agents in G2.
Claim 24. By the end of Step 2, the allocation is (3/4)-EFR with respect to the agents in G2.
Proof. Let i be an agent in G2, we show that for every other agent j, we have
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
] ≤ 4/3 · vi(Ai) ,
therefore the allocation is (3/4)-EFR.
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• For an agent j in G1, only one item is allocated to this agent and the claim clearly holds.
• Consider an agent j in G2. Recall that Aj = {bj , b′j} is the bundle of this agent. We first consider the
case that vi(bi) < vi(bj). In this case the position of agent i in the topological order O is before agent
j. Therefore, agent i receives his second good before agent j, and we have
vi(b
′
i) ≥ vi(b′j) . (4)
Moreover, by Observation 12 we have
vi(bj)
vi(bi)
≤ rj
ri
<
ϕ
2
. (5)
It follows that
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
]
=
vi(bj) + vi(b
′
j)
2
Claim 22.
≤ vi(bj) + vi(b
′
i)
2
By (4).
<
ϕ/2 · vi(bi) + vi(b′i)
2
By (5).
≤ ϕ
4
· (vi(bi) + vi(b′i)) Since ϕ/2 > 1.
Since ϕ =
√
3 + 1, we have ϕ4 < 1. Therefore,
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
] ≤ ϕ
4
· (vi(bi) + vi(b′i))
< vi(bi) + vi(b
′
i) = vi(Ai) .
Therefore, if vi(bi) < vi(bj), the allocation is EFR. The other case is when vi(bi) ≥ vi(bj). In that case
we have
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
]
=
vi(bj) + vi(b
′
j)
2
Claim 22.
≤ vi(bj) + vi(bi)/ri
2
Observation 13.
≤ vi(bi) + vi(bi)/ri
2
vi(bi) ≥ vi(bj).
=
1 + 1/ri
2
· vi(bi)
<
3
4
· vi(bi) ≤ 3
4
· vi(Ai) , ri > 2.
therefore the allocation in this case is EFR.
• The only remaining case is when agent j is in G3. By Observation 13, valuation of b′j and b′′j for agent i
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is at most vi(bi)/ri. Also, by Observation 12, valuation of bj for agent i is at most rj · vi(bi)/ri. Thus,
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
]
=
2
3
· (vi(bj) + vi(b′j) + vi(b′′j )) Claim 22.
≤ 2
3
· (vi(bj) + 2vi(bi)/ri) Observation 13.
≤ 2
3
· (rj · vi(bi)/ri + 2vi(bi)/ri) Observation 12.
≤ 2
3
· (vi(bi) + 2vi(bi)/ri) rj < ri.
=
2 + 4/ri
3
· vi(bi)
<
4
3
· vi(bi) ≤ 4
3
· vi(Ai) . ri > 2.
Therefore the allocation is (3/4)-EFR.
Now we show that by the end of Step 2, the allocation is (2/ϕ)-EFR with respect to the agents in G3.
Claim 25. By the end of Step 2, the allocation is (2/ϕ)-EFR with respect to the agents in G3.
Proof. Let i be an agent in G3, we show that for every other agent j, we have
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
] ≤ ϕ/2 · vi(Ai) ,
therefore the allocation is (2/ϕ)-EFR.
• For an agent j in G1, the claim clearly holds since this agent has only one allocated item.
• Consider an agent j ∈ G2. Agent i receives his second item before agent j in Step 2 of our algorithm.
Thus, we have
vi(b
′
i) ≥ vi(b′j) . (6)
Also, by Observation 12, valuation of bj for agent i is at most rj · vi(bi). Thus,
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
]
=
vi(bj) + vi(b
′
j)
2
Claim 22.
≤ vi(bj) + vi(b
′
i)
2
By (6).
≤ rjvi(bi) + vi(b
′
i)
2
Observation 12.
≤ ϕvi(bi) + vi(b
′
i)
2
rj ≤ ϕ.
≤ ϕ
2
· (vi(bi) + vi(b′i)) Since ϕ > 1.
≤ ϕ
2
· vi(Ai) .
Therefore the allocation is (2/ϕ)-EFR.
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• The remaining case is when agent j is in G3. Consider the case that vi(bi) < vi(bj). In this case the
position of agent i in the topological order O is before agent j. Therefore, in Step 2 of our algorithm,
agent i receives his second and third items before agent j, and we have the followings.
vi(b
′
i) ≥ vi(b′j) , (7)
and
vi(b
′′
i ) ≥ vi(b′′j ) . (8)
Also, by Observation 12, valuation of bj for agent i is at most rj · vi(bi). Thus,
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
]
=
2
3
· (vi(bj) + vi(b′j) + vi(b′′j )) Claim 22.
≤ 2
3
· (vi(bj) + vi(b′i) + vi(b′′i )) By (7) and (8).
≤ 2
3
· (rjvi(bi) + vi(b′i) + vi(b′′i )) Observation 12.
≤ 2
3
· (2vi(bi) + vi(b′i) + vi(b′′i )) rj ≤ 2.
≤ 4
3
· (vi(bi) + vi(b′i) + vi(b′′i ))
=
4
3
· vi(Ai) .
Thus, the allocation is (3/4)-EFR. Since 2/ϕ < 3/4, the allocation is also (2/ϕ)-EFR.
The other case is when vi(bi) ≥ vi(bj). In this case agent i receives b′i prior to when agent j receives
b′′j , and we have
vi(b
′
i) ≥ vi(b′′j ) (9)
Also, by Observation 13, valuation of b′j for agent i is at most vi(bi). Thus,
E
b∼Dj
[
vi(Aj \ {b})
]
=
2
3
· (vi(bj) + vi(b′j) + vi(b′′j )) Claim 22.
≤ 2
3
· (vi(bi) + vi(b′j) + vi(b′′j )) vi(bi) ≥ vi(bj).
≤ 2
3
· (vi(bi) + vi(b′j) + vi(b′i)) By (9).
≤ 2
3
· (vi(bi) + vi(bi) + vi(b′i)) Observation 13.
≤ 4
3
· (vi(bi) + vi(b′i))
≤ 4
3
· vi(Ai) ,
and the allocation is (3/4)-EFR as well as (2/ϕ)-EFR.
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